

NOTES

101-102 Hosty notebook entry; hot news from Texas; Feldman; etc.
See separate list identifying items # 1-11.

#1. Telegram re arrival of Carr party; consistent with sequence of events as described in Ford book, pp. 13-15.

#2. Of course, the listing of interviews of Oswald hardly removes all doubts concerning his relations with the FBI, even if that listing is complete. The last sentence, in which Hoover asks to be contacted directly if there are any further questions, may suggest that he was not happy about the prospects of an independent investigation of these allegations - and for good reason.

#3. We should compare this with the Feldman article to see if Redlich missed anything important. Note point F, page 2 - Redlich was aware of the "investigation" of the NO FPCC office. Page 3, B: good point. D: was this resolved?

#4. Very interesting - the Hosty entry omission was apparently taken very seriously; they were aware of the possible effects on the FBI's cooperation.

#5. Evidently some people were strongly resisting the idea of such a letter to the FBI. The letter is #7.

#6. Was this ever checked out? Stanford may have been in a good position to know who was a possible informant; some of the rumors floating around may have been good ones.

#7. After all that fuss, this is really a pretty mild letter.

#8-9. Why did Willens want this information on the record? Perhaps so the WC could not be accused of not taking note of everything they already had when they wrote Hoover; perhaps because of a suspicion that the 2/11 report was sent over in response to the WC's interest. The latter is possible despite the date of the letter; it was drafted a week earlier. I wonder what sort of unofficial pipelines the FBI had into the Commission's investigation?

#10. The FBI's explanation is hardly credible. See my previous memo, indicating that the Hosty entry was not omitted but deleted. As I recall (check this), the first listing did not indicate it was only of items of investigative interest, and in fact contained some items of no interest; on the contrary, one could have reasonably inferred that it was complete; the later report contained practically nothing of any substance besides the Hosty entry. Both Gemberling and Kesler say that Hosty was left out because his identity was known and was not lead information; Hoover's testimony (5H112), apparently read from a prepared statement, was that it was left out because the circumstances under which it appeared were known. This is not supported by the affidavits. I think the FBI was just plain lying; I should do a very detailed memo on this. One interesting point is that they seem to have gotten away with it; when Stern prepared a list of questions for the FBI about a month later, he asked only (CE 833, # 30) why the second report was prepared. Hoover did not answer that question, but referred to the Gemberling affidavit, which just plain does not answer that question. If I had been in Sam Stern's position, I would have interpreted the FBI's position as: here is our answer, and if you don't like its very obvious deficiencies you can just go ahead and do something about it. I would like to talk to Stern, about this and other issues that come up between him and the FBI. I don't recall any later interest by the WC; should check for it. This episode really stinks!

11. Wesley J. strikes again. I don't recall seeing that it was checked.

103-104 Affidavits; information from agents

#1 I'm not sure what this is about - should get referenced memo. May be re Ruby.

#2. Stern refers to a draft of follow-up questions; the first set was CE 833. I should try to find the follow-ups. He is still pushing for consideration of a request for all internal FBI documents; the draft he refers to is presumably that of March 10, which I have; the request was removed from the letter of March 26. Page 2 - Stern describes the FBI's answers as "circumspect," an understatement. He does not list DeBruys; apparently (and understandably) had not caught on to his

significance. That is, the FBI's coverup seems to have worked. This is a significant letter; Stern was an important person. Is he still in Washington? Has he been talked to? I went through his office file at the Archives, but rather hastily; perhaps it should be checked again. I expect that withheld part of it has some goodies.

#3. Why on earth restrict the request to "a representative group" - why not all of them? I suggest Stern's ideas were systematically being watered down by his superiors.

Epstein says Stern told him no independent check was ever made of the FBI HQ file. (Inquest, page 36. There are very few references to Stern indexed, although Epstein did interview him.)

#4. Routine answer to #3.

105. The FBI files; WC disinterest.

#1. Although there is no explicit reference to the FBI in this letter, if you believe that the FBI is part of the JD, this is a request for information about all additional information in the files. Katzenbach's reply should be checked. #2-3: First sentences suggest that Rankin was not aware of the significance of the Field Office files. (Belmont did testify that all reports and information developed during a case are sent to HQ. May not even be true in general; certainly not true in this case. 5H3.) Rankin says the FBI did not want to disclose "secret techniques." Improper, perhaps, but hardly secret. What is striking, besides the WC's delicacy in this matter, is how few of the items (even just those in the HQ file) they had.

Refer to my recent memo regarding interception of LHO's letters to the FPCC and the CP. I am now persuaded that the HQ file was purged before the WC was given the list.

#4: I wonder if McCloy did follow up his interest?

106. Revill

#1. Should check Rankin's letter of 5/21. Curry's explanation is not convincing.

121-123 Unidentified man photo; other CIA; Mexico trip.

See also the newly released CD's for information on the photo.

#1. Seems consistent with other information, except that it indicates contact with both embassies was noted. CD 347 is a still-withheld CIA report.

#2. The FBI wasn't offering much information, was it.

#3. Does this mean that as of 2/12 the WC was satisfied with the explanation?

#4. Options 1 and 2 in the third paragraph must be some sort of joke. Was option 3 - still a poor substitute for an investigation - chosen? I don't recall any sign that it was.

#5. I have the referenced letter and additional information on the photo in a separate file.

6, # 7. Nothing unusual here.

8, point 2: see recently received stuff. As I recall, at one of the embassies there was a tap or bug which enabled them to get Oswald's name.

Second page (page 3 of letter), point 5: I assume they are hiding the CIA bug. I should check the referenced draft to see what information was not covered.

124. State department interest in defectors.

Separate memo included with the pages. A couple of pages from CD 294, just released, relate, but I saw nothing of special interest.

131 - Substantive - Basic evidence (Dallas, medical, etc.)

Much is self-explanatory and of obvious interest; only not-so-obvious comments and leads are noted here.

- #1-2. The requested SS memo is CD 80.
- #4. See also Accessories, Ch.6. Another question: why did LHO make the cards?
- #5. Did the FBI ever really try to reproduce the rifle photo? A reasonable request. The photos described in #7 are not that close.
- #9. Suspiciously brief.
- #11. Amazing - no request that copies be made. Should get FBI letter of 3/27.
- #12. Lots of good points. Do we believe that prisoners routinely had access to the jail telephone?
- #13. Revealing in regard to the prejudices about the sequence of shots, etc.
- #15. Important. RFK did not refuse the autopsy photos.
- #16. It would be interesting to see just what the FBI considered "all available film taken near the TSED following the shooting." Check CD 897.
- #17. As of May 12, Specter was writing as if the autopsy photos were to be examined soon. What happened? Some good suggestions here, which the review panel did not go into.
- #19. WJL and Ely said the recordings should be obtained and listened to; they did not suggest that the FBI be asked to do this. Wonder why the suggestion was rejected.
- #21. I'm not convinced that the last paragraph is not hiding something.
- #22. Cf. CE 705, CE 1974. Most of the errors in the former were not corrected. Wonder why the WC specified transcription of only "related" messages? I wouldn't trust the FBI to make that determination.
- #24. CE 1974 can hardly have been checked for accuracy!!

14X - Substantive, N.O. related

- #1. I don't have CD 75, pp. 532-3; should get.
- #2. Note that DeBrueys is named as "identified as probably present at one or more interviews." I guess that Stern's source was CE 2003, p. 161; also CE 2003, p. 24H197 indicates that he only assisted in the investigation. But weren't there many other FBI men in the latter category? And, if DeB did not attend the interrogations, why not? Not that many FBI agents were sent to Dallas so quickly, were they? He may have been at some of the sessions but discreetly unobtrusive.
- Note also that Barrett is listed in 1b. We have only an inadequate report by him.
- #6. First half of last sentence is far from obviously true.
- #9. I don't know which CD this is from; I got it from an office file. Note that the FBI did have references to Bringuier and his buddies.

15X Substantive - Ruby

- #5. Should get referenced letter, dated April 3.
- #7. Should get the attachment.
- #8. Check CD 914 to see why this was referred to the Criminal Division.
- #9. Lots of good points. Especially 3c, 3f, 4a, 6.
- #12. Unusually blunt denial by the FBI.
- #17. Presumably all those reports are in CD 1085? Apparently only the summary, CD 1085e7, was given the Commission. Not good enough.

161 Terre Haute Mauser incident.

I think this was in the papers; Lifton may have the details. I suspect there was nothing to it but the Commission should have been more interested. I haven't seen any indication that the FBI was asked to investigate. These reports were found in the GA3 file, of all places. P. 5 indicates FBI was involved already.

2XX. Misc. substantive and procedural-substantive stuff. Obvious comments omitted.

- #4. This relates to Mrs. Lou Wylie Hayes, who is unreliable; we have more info.
- #5, item 2 should be followed up. The attached memo proves that Dulles was still effectively in contact with the CIA for information.
- #8. Check what this article was.
- #9. I don't know what this was connected with.

- #30. Not a bad observation.
- #37. Don't know what this is.
- #39. A rare letter to the CIA. Gary should have this.
- #40-41. I don't understand what this is all about. The referenced articles should be looked at.
- #44. Apparently the LHS file does not reflect the info about LHO in Mexico in October 1963. (Cf. CE 834, item 57.)
- #46-47. The routing slip was misfiled; it apparently is unrelated to the letter to which it is stapled. I would like to see the report that is referred to. I guess that the Mann file relates to the story of "D" (WR 308-9). (Mann was Ambassador to Mexico.) The CIA materials presumably relate to the unidentified man photos. Also note that some Oswald material was sent to "CIA/Mexico" within the State Department but no such file was given to the Commission. I should ask for it under the Freedom of Information Act.
- #48. Wonder what "concern" Rankin expressed about CE 2964 - that LHO looked as if he had been mistreated? (That's just a guess.)
- #50. The response is CE 3153. I find the entire exchange unsatisfactory.
- #54. This is one of the attachments to CE 3146 that were not made into CD's and could not be found for me.
- #61. The interest in this is that Liebelier made all sorts of minor changes to make his half of the interview sound smoother. Is this SOP?
- # 62-64. As a whole, this chronology isn't worth much. I got these two pages because they refer to withheld CD's; another page was denied me (after I had seen it) for that reason.

3XX. Good points.

In general, I was struck by the extent to which various people, especially the junior staff, came up with rather perceptive ideas. One wonders how much if this was an attempt to look good for the record, and how much of their research was cut short by their superiors, the FBI, or the press of time. Obviously both were factors. Many of the ideas in these pages may have been checked out, and we could profitably check the Commission's files for what was done; this applies to much of this section, and I have noted only a few special items here.

#3. They really could have used a scientist or two.

#7. Good old Sam Stern again. Esp. items 3,4.

This section also includes some suggestions that struck me as being particularly dumb. E.g., #9.

#10, item 5: refers to Lloyd John Wilson, apparently a real crazy. (We have CD's)

#12, page 2: apparently Marina misbehaved when she was in Washington. Refers to CD on the "Martin incident"?

#25, item 13. Check.

#32. As noted in my memos on the head shot, why were so many conferences needed to determine such a simple fact?

#40, Molina; check FBI response.

#59, list of stuff checked out of Library of Congress. Note that Liebelier had the issue of the Militant with the "LH" letter. We should check the other issues listed.

#60. Check SS151. This didn't look familiar to me when I saw it.

#61. From a list of proposed questions for Marina. The author - not indicated on this page; I forgot to write it down - didn't catch on that Quiroga was an FBI informant. (First question.) However, apparently Oswald did catch on right away!

411 - Procedures for getting information, and troubles therein - the FBI:

#1. Confirms that the FBI Summary Report was meant to be made public. Note that on Dec. 9 Katzenbach suggested that the WC declare LHO guilty. ("Beyond a reasonable doubt.")

#2. At least in form, this is a very broad request. Obviously, it was not complied with.

Note that the correspondence starts out on a "Dear Lee" and "Dear Edgar" (Edgar?) basis; it gets (understandably) more formal later.

#3. The enclosed reports are (I think) CD's 4-7. Note that they were not sent over until the Commission asked for them.

#4. The enclosures are CD's 8 - 75, more or less. (Check.) Note that the "missing" CD 61 is nonexistent; CD 60 was listed twice. There is some confusion about the DeBrueys reports of December 2 (CD 75) and Dec. 8 (CD 6), which are listed with dates interchanged in the FBI lists. I guess it was an innocent mistake.

Note that Hoover's letter does not say that the 5 included pre-assassination reports on Oswald are all such. That is not an unreasonable inference from the language. That was probably not an innocent mistake.

I don't see how there could have been 141, not 140, enclosures.

#5 - same as item 1, section 105, above.

#6. Significant. The FBI wanted to avoid complicating matters with unnecessary requests, etc. This conversation also put the Commission in the position of having requested all the junk they were later given.

#7. In the FBI is part of the JD, Katzenbach was mistaken if he understood that the Commission was getting all the files.

#8. Important. The FBI's excuse is too feeble to be taken seriously - doesn't it have indexes? Evidently Willens did not see any of the significant aspects of the DeBrueys report. Note last two sentences*. Apparently the DeB report, at least, was never sent over officially. The only copy I know of is in the State Dept. file.

*(of the first page, that is)

#9. The response to this is CE 833. I have the original draft of this by Stern, which included a broad request for FBI records. That bears the notation "DRAFT-Stern/aw/10Mar64"; this letter is "JIR:SAS:HPW:al 3/25/64 ret." I take this to indicate that Willens squashed Stern's request.

#10. Should get the attached letter. Third paragraph presumably resulted in CD 1085.

#11, point 11f. Even Liebeler didn't seem to have made much of the incompleteness of the FBI HQ file.

412 DOD, including ONI.

My old file on the ONI problem is not included. I was surprised to find so little correspondence with the DOD at the Archives. I suspect the WC just gave up on them.

#5 - response may be a CE; check.

413 Other agencies, including CIA, INS

I have the GA-1-CIA file also.

#3. Wonder what was enclosed.

#4. The request for confidentiality is odd. Was it honored? Check the CE's. Did the PO do anything further, as alleged?

#5. A cleaned-up version of this (references to Apt deleted) is CE 3038.

#6. Don't know what this refers to - presumably some FBI report?

(#6-8: when I requested the GA-1-CIA file a long time ago, these routing slips, which are routine but no more so than the rest of the file, were not included.)

#9 - nothing special; I got this to complete my CIA file; it had been omitted.

#11- I had this already, from the Texas Archives. Carr sure was upset. The "Dear General" salutation amuses me. Would Carr have written to Liebeler as "Dear Assistant"?

414 - the public. Self-explanatory; amusing.

421-422 Extent of the investigation; back-patting.

#1. This is the cover letter for CD 76, which I had even when it was withheld. Poor overworked FBI! JEH is really a master of this kind of letter-writing. As I

translate it, Hoover says "here is the kind of nonsense we have wasted our time on but of course if you want more details, or more of that kind of investigation, we would be glad to do it." Hoover was still hoping to have the WC just endorse his findings.

#5. I gather Rankin was quite unhappy with Ely's work. My own impression is that his memos were unusually good, and should be consulted for such things as LHO's marine career in preference to the final Report.

#11. This is how the WC got the Huber tape - it was volunteered by the public.

#13. Don't know what this refers to.

#14. Interesting. Page 2 - 80 people transferred to Dallas (this includes DeBrueys?). Last sentence: "tragic undertaking." He said it, not me.

#15. I guess it was nice (and routine) for the Commission to be so cooperative with a private film-maker.

#16. Apparently Warren through the early drafts were unfair in their criticism of the FBI. They should be checked.

#21. Gushy, isn't it? Evidently the FBI often expressed doubts about "the necessity or desirability" of some of the WC's inquiries, but never turned down its requests; that indicates how effectively such inquiries were turned off informally, thanks to the liaison procedures. Even "with kindest personal regards," Lee and Edgar are not going back to first-name familiarity.

#22. First paragraph is amusing: thanks for the Texas report, it sure is printed on nice paper. That is, they strained to say something favorable about it.

423 Signs of dissatisfaction and trouble. Self-explanatory.

#5. I am struck by the realization that that junior staff was expected to do a really massive amount of work. Compare the 9 months they had with the 7 years the critics have been working. Even if they had been inclined to do a more critical job, they would have been hard pressed.

#6. I have the letter as sent and the FBI reply, I think.

424 RFK and the investigation

#1-3. Compare CE 3025. This exchange is referred to at WR 374. In summary, the one instance where RFK's prestige was invoked publicly to endorse the report involved an exchange of letters both of which were written by Willens. Far out. This may be standard procedure but I'm still a bit surprised. Note that although RFK's reply is verbatim identical to the draft, it was dated August 4, nearly two months after the letter was sent to him. Might there have been a reason for this delay? I don't think Bobby was that busy running for vice-president. It might pay to correlate these dates with what was happening. Maybe he didn't want to endorse the WR while he was still in the running for veep.

Note that the letters, and Willens' memo of June 4, indicate that Hoover had not been keeping RFK informed. RFK told Willens that he "had not received any reports" from Hoover about the assassination; we now know that they did not speak to each other for the last 6 months of RFK's service as AG.

#4-5. This may be perfectly innocent, but I am struck by a paranoid interpretation: Hoover is notifying RFK that his attitude toward the WC is of interest, and that if RFK took the Commie line and questioned the official version that would be noted. Otherwise, what reason for Hoover to note this report in L'Unité? Wasn't it also in the NY Times? (Check that.)

425 - Procedures at termination; persisting FBI (dis)interest

#1 - fits in with the picture of the FBI as the WC's only investigative arm.

#2-3: who exactly told the WC that its responsibilities ended 9/24? Perhaps that is the necessary legal interpretation.

#5-7: so, the FBI reacted to Goldberg's suggestions as it would have to mine. So much for the FBI's unstinting cooperation. I have the 1/14 letter referred to in #6; this should be followed up. This version seems to have been dropped. Important?

431-432 Liason procedures within the Commission; how little the Commissioners knew and did

Much of what I saw at the Archives confirms the picture given in Inquest. To the staff, Rankin was the Commission; the Commissioners were little more than reasonably well-informed outsiders most of the time. Very little material involves the Commissioners at all; some of the senior counsel did little more. (Point: does the Archives have the office files for the Commissioners and Rankin, or just the staff?) There are occasional requests and suggestions from the Commissioners that read like (and were treated like) letters from complete outsiders.

- #1. Note first sentences of point 2.
- #2. Illegible; Ford had written about the rifle photo in the Detroit paper.
- #6. The memo of 1/11/64 mentioned in the first sentence refers, I would think, to CD 102, which bears that date. Maybe Ford got the originals and that is why they were (are?) missing? If so, we should be able to get them from Ford's files.
- #7. Evidently relates to Lovelady photo.
- #8. I guess Jenner wasn't used to doing "grubby work." Too bad.
- #9. Amusing that Ford thinks of the staff as "you people."
- #10. Compare Liebel's claim that Jenner was too busy running for ABA office to do much work.
- #11. This is from Craig, Oswald's defender, who can be satisfied by reading the conclusions of the report. Gads!
- #12. Evidently a meeting with Warren was a big thing, even for Willens.
- #13. This is the last page of a letter from Jenner to Rankin. They seem to be Goldwater Republicans, and anti-RFK too. The WC could have used a fanatical JFK Democrat.

433 WC's view of its job.

- #1. Here again is how LBJ twisted Warren's arm.
- #2. Third paragraph is odd. What was Rankin afraid of?
- #7. Goldberg got it right: the WC's first client was the public, not the Truth.

441 Getting the staff together (except Redlich)

- #1, p. 1: Incidentally, the name of Dr. Overholser rings a bell - wasn't he in the news just a few weeks ago with some crazy theory?
- #1. It is clear here, as elsewhere, that the WC was simply overwhelmed by the volume of material sent over by the FBI. Since Rankin apparently didn't want the staff to be embarrassed by asking for stuff they already had (Item #2, sect. 433), this left the FBI in great shape if they wanted to hide things. Hoover is no fool.
- #5, page 2 - interesting that at first they wanted to get the junior staff from within the government. I recall seeing that the opposite had been true.
- #7. I think Mosk left for Reserve duty. I don't know if this refusal to sign indicates any unhappiness with the WC's work.
- #8. Gushy letter. Note that Adams got one also.
- #9. I don't know what the attorneys listed at the top were doing.

442 Appointment of Redlich and reaction thereto.

- #1. Given the reaction, it is ironic that Redlich volunteered, unsolicited.
- #2. I don't know if only Ball and Redlich got the full field investigation treatment. If so, why Ball?
- #4. I'm curious as to just how "radical" that Nation article was; maybe the problem was just that Frantz was suspect.
- #6. I think the original draft of this form letter is more revealing than the shortened version which was used. The big question in my mind is why Redlich turned out to be one of the worst (least critical and suspicious) of the staff members. Was he intimidated by, and reacting to, all that criticism and pressure, or was his ECLC interest out of character. For the kind of work he did he should have been disbarred from the ECLC.

I was struck by the great size of the files of public and Congressional comment on Redlich.

451-452 Procedures for testimony; selection of witnesses; summaries of testimony
#1. Point 1, I have seen some of these lists of proposed questions. I wonder why they decided to take only a statement from LJB and Mrs. LBJ? Point 6: we should check the draft to see if the material referred to is the autopsy photos.
#6. Good points. Compare #61, section 2XX, above.
#7. Note RYK, Nosenko.
#9. Wonder why this memo was to Mrs. Eide, Rankin's secretary?

453 Routine handling of reports; dissemination, copies, typos, etc.
#1,2. Note that making a copy of an FBI report was a decision that had to be considered. If the WC couldn't even Xerox FBI reports without their permission, how likely were they to really investigate the FBI's mistakes?
#4. This relates to CD 87. It might be amusing to check the attached list to see which of the SS reports were found to be of interest. I believe the Secret documents mentioned in the last paragraph would be those received from the CIA, relating to LHO in Mexico. (See CD 674, just released.)
#6. I'm not familiar with the chronology of the FBI interviews of Ruby, so this requested change may not be as much of a simple typo as the FBI would like us think.
#7. The referenced letter is Section 101, #2; the referenced memo should be gotten.
#8. Was SISS doing an investigation? What happened to it?
#9. Even in August, the pre-assassination FBI reports on LHO were classified and treated as such.

454 Leaks, avoidance and investigation of; confidentiality of reports.
#1. See page 2. The reference is to CD 329, page 351, which is just released.
#15. I would like to see the referenced 9/30 letter, and also that of 1/18. Page 2, middle; I assume this means that Belmont persuaded Stern that various reports should not be released; I question that the FBI's true reason was that it might reflect on innocent persons. Page 1, 2nd paragraph: other than to conceal sources, especially re Mexico, I was not aware that the FBI had revised certain pages. I would like to know which ones. Perhaps the Civello item, CE 1536, was one such?

46X - Various odd procedures. 461 - interest in critics, Mama Oswald, etc.
#1. The two paragraphs on Turner amuse me. He had a poor attitude toward Hoover and used provocative adjectives! Interesting that Hoover pretended not to take Feldman's article seriously, lumping it with the other two; the WC took it very seriously indeed.
#2. Pretty heavy surveillance of Lane, and the WC wanted even more!
#3. Wonder what Lane was doing illegal (or nearly so?) in Detroit?
#4. Was the article submitted to the CIA, or does it have sources in the American Security Council?
#5. Apparently being pro-de Gaulle was bad. The attachment is CE 1808. (A bad translation - I'm sure "old nurse" in the second paragraph should be "former nurse." I know about the two meanings of "ancienne" from first-year French. We should not trust the FBI's translation of sensitive Russian material (e.g., the Walker note.))
#6. No indication of conclusions reached or action taken?
#7. The long arm of the FBI reaches to the Daily Cal. I should give them a copy. The reference is to CD 913, pp. 69-72, which are available but I don't have.
#10. This confirms that the FBI (deB?) was pushing Pena a bit.

462 Odd investigative interests, including Paines, DeM.
#6. Should try to get this.

463-464 Wrong questions; discreet inquiries, fake subpoenas, etc.
#1. Don't know what if anything this all means, and why the FBI was asked to be discreet.
#2. The correct question was, did the FBI or someone else intercept the letter?

#3. The question should have been, did the FBI know (or should it have known) about any such subscription at the time.

#4-5. See my letter of March 24 to the Washington Post concerning the use of such phony after-the-fact subpoenas. The banks, etc. are still denying that they give out such information without a subpoena.

47X Miscellaneous procedural topics

471 The great footnote controversy (amusing only)

472 Other funny (ha-ha or odd) things

#2. I don't know whom WJL was chaperon for.

#3. Note they are still shooting for a June-July deadline.

#4. At least someone was working late. Does this mean they started in May?

#6. Heavy task is right. I don't think I have the letter to Warren; should get.

#7. I have sent this to Bud already.

473 Handling of the files; transcription services, etc.

#3, 3rd paragraph. That file is Entry 3, withheld.

Generally speaking, the files were in rather poor shape. The investigation was, one might suspect, in even worse shape.

48X Putting out the report: outlines and agendas; "conclusions first", objectives, progress. Mostly self-explanatory (self-condemning.)

Agendas should be compared with the Executive Session transcripts to see what is still withheld.

They didn't waste any time getting the report outlined.

#7. Isn't March 16 a bit early to be writing the introduction to the Report?

#14. Note item 3, RFK and autopsy photos.

#20. This gives a good picture of where the last 5 volumes came from, and why there is so much good stuff there.

49X (De)classification, suppression, deletions

#1-3: worth reading in detail. HW has made notes on some of these.

#6, item 2. This essentially confirms what I had deduced earlier, that Odum DE

1 was returned to the CIA for doctoring after it had been entered into evidence.

I really don't see why the CIA thinks it is such a big secret that it takes photos

at the Embassies in Mexico City. Point 9: the fact that they had "many copies" of

CD 1 is really irrelevant; the discrepancies with the final Report are important.

#7. I presume this refers to the autopsy photos. "No information" is a bit of an exaggeration.

#10, point 5: this explains the condition of CD's 294 and 1114-5, where some of the original documents have been replaced by copies of CE's. Sometimes the CE was taken

from another copy of the document, so some information (handwritten comments, etc.)

may have been lost. Point 7: the CD's were basically expected to be withheld.

#12. This sounds plausible to me. I don't recall any other official description of what was deleted, however.

5xx: the Report

501 Deadlines (and how they kept receding)

502 Distribution; technicalities

#3, p. 2. I don't blame Warren for not wanting a press conference.

#4. Several people wrote the WC complaining about giving the Report to the Commies.

I recall that the USSR later banned distribution.

504 Terminal editing; clean-up activities

#5-6 Only two small differences between these memos.

#8. Should check on what was changed; it may have been important.

#12. I did not see the attachment; it might occasionally be a convenient index; we should have it found.